| Lynn Festa - 2006 - عدد الصفحات: 326
...every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists personal identity, ie, the sameness of a rational being.") This reflexive splitting of the self makes it possible to direct, or at least to monitor, identifications.... | |
| Gary Pendlebury - 2006 - عدد الصفحات: 232
...everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things: in this alone consists personal identity, ie the sameness of a rational being.13 The mention of substance here is a throwaway comment in that Locke does not consider substance... | |
| Alain de Libera - 2007 - عدد الصفحات: 452
...l'entendement humain, II, xxVII, § 9, in Identité et différence..., p. 148 (trad. Balibar, p. 149) : «And as far as this consciousness can be extended...thought, so far reaches the identity of that person»; § 14, p. 158 (trad., p. 159) : « personal identity reaching no farther than consciousness reaches»;... | |
| J. J. Valberg - 2007 - عدد الصفحات: 524
...Locke says about the sameness (identity) of consciousness in which personal identity consists that "as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards...thought, so far reaches the identity of that person." (section 11). Such talk of consciousness "extending," or again "reaching," to past actions, etc., which... | |
| Jonathan Eric Adler, Catherine Z. Elgin - 2007 - عدد الصفحات: 897
...personal identity — that is, the sameness of a rational being — consists in consciousness alone, and, as far as this consciousness can be extended...past action or thought, so far reaches the identity ofthat person. So that, whatever hath the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person... | |
| Lex Newman - 2007 - عدد الصفحات: 18
..."the same" in the sense relevant to personal identity? Trading on Locke's remark that "as far as ... consciousness can be extended backwards to any past...Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person" (E II.xxvii.9: 335), commentators have frequently attributed to Locke the view that a later person... | |
| Jacob van Kokswijk - 2007 - عدد الصفحات: 265
...distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists Personal Identity' (...)' And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action of Thought, so far reaches the identity of that Person'. Samuel Drew - after joining the Methodist... | |
| John T. Lynch - 2008 - عدد الصفحات: 244
...every one to be, what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, ie the sameness...that Person; it is the same self now it was then; and 'tis by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that the Action was done." Personal... | |
| Min Wild - 2008 - عدد الصفحات: 252
...everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things: in this alone consists personal identity, ie the sameness of a rational being. (280-81) What is happening here is that consciousness is not firmly anchored to individual bodies,... | |
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