would I have gathered thy children as a hen gathereth her chickens; under her wings, and ye would not? and again, (i) you will not come unto me that ye might have life; how could we help it? might they truly anfwer; provided they were difabled both from coming, and from being willing fo to do.

CHAPTER IV.

Shewing the Affinity of the Opinions of our Adverfaries concerning Liberty, with that of Mr. Hobbs; and with the Fate of the Philofophers, condemned by the Chriftian Fathers.

THE peculiar notions of Mr. Hobbs, and of thofe who con

cur with him in thefe opinions (that our liberty is well confiftent with neceflity, as being only a power to do what we will, though we lie under a neceffity to have that will; and that it is fufficient that we choofe to do what we do, though we lie under a neceffity, if we choose at all, to choose as we do) lie under this confiderable difadvantage, that they were univerfally condemned by all chriftians for the first four centuries, who afferted, that a liberty from neceffity was a fundamental principle, without which there was no place for vice or vir tue, praise or difpraife, rewards or punishments, heaven or hell but an introduction of ftoical fate; confuting that and manicheifm, and other herefies on this very account, that they destroyed the liberty of man's will, and left them under a neceffity, and a determination to one. I therefore fhall endeav our to fhew,

;

1ft. That there is a plain agreement betwixt the doctrine of Mr. Hobbs, and of thefe men concerning this matter, as to the great concernments of religion.

2dly. That their opinion differs very little, and in things only of little moment, from the ftoical fate, and lies obnoxious to the fame abfurdities which the philofophers and chriftians did object against it.

3dly. That their doctrine hath been condemned by all the primitive chriftians for the first four centuries. And,

4thly. That St. Auftin, who first introduced the contrary doctrine, is forced by it to contradi&t his former felf, to renounce what he had faid in confutation of the manichees; is unable to answer his own arguments, and falleth into manifest abfurdities. And,

SECTION 1.1ft. That there is a manifeft agreement betwixt their opinion and that of Mr. Hobbs, will be evident from an exact comparison of their words together. Mr. Hobbs then afferts,

1ft. That though the will be neceffitated, yet the doing what we will is liberty; which is perfectly the fame with their affertion, that (k) the liberty of the will confifts not in a freedom from neceffity, but only in a freedom from coaction or compulFion.

2dly. That (1) he who takes away the liberty of doing according to our will, taketh away the nature of fin; but he that denies the liberty to will, doth not do fo. And do not they say this who teach (m) that though fallen manis become fo far a flave to fin, that whatever he does he cannot but fin; yet that necef Jety of doing evil takes not away his natural liberty, and therefore not his fin

3dly. That (n) if liberty cannot stand with neceffity, it cannot ftand with the decrees of God; of which decrees neceffity is a confequent. And what do they fay lefs who teach (0) that them whom God calls according to his purpofe, he fo moves to believe in God and to love God and his brother, that faith, and love infallibly thence follow; and when that motion comes, it is impoffible for man not to believe and love God.

(k) 'Exéosov, quod eft liberum poteft confiftere cum ávalxaiy, fed non cum axxolw. Urfin.- -71) Bramh. Caf. p. 803.

(m) Quamvis enim, abfente Gratia, homo fit peccati fervus, et quicquid agat non poffit nifi peccare, ifta tamen malè agendi neceffitas naturalem ejus libertatem non tollit. Le Blanc de Lib. Hom. Arb. circa bonum Morale, Part. 2. Sec. 39.—(n) Br. p. 828.

(0) Deus hominem quem fecundum propofitum vocat, fic movet ad credendum Deo et ad diligendum Deum et proximum, ut infallibiliter inde fequatur fides et dilectio, et pofita tali motione impoffibile eft hominem non credere atque diligere. Le Blanc. de Lib. Hom. Arb. Par. 3. Sec. 17. and Sec. 21. Utrique in eo conveniunt, neceffe effe ut aga ille quem ad agendum movet, atque impellit Divine Gratiæ, vel providentiæ vis et efficacia, quoniam ab illa actione Dei actio hominis feparari non poteft.

;

4thly. That a man's will is fomething but the liberty of his will is nothing. And most proteftants, faith (p) Le Blanc, deny that after man's fall there remained any liberty in him to do what is morally good.

5thly. That (q) he is free to a thing, who may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear if he have the will to forbear; and yet if it be neceffary that he should have (r) the will to do, the action is neceffarily to follow; and if there be a neceffity that he shall have the will to forbear, the forbearing alfo will be neceffary. So that according to him, he that hath a will to do, lies under a neceffity to have that will, and he that hath a will to forbear, lies under a neceffity to have the will to forbear; his choice being determined to what he shall choose by precedent neceffary caufes. Now is he not under a neceffity to have the will to forbear what is morally good, who hath loft his liberty to what is fo; and is not he under a like neceffity of willing only what is evil, who, whatsoever he doth, and therefore whatsoever he wills to do, can only do evil?

6thly. He adds, that () the neceffity of an action doth not make the law that prohibits it unjuft; for it is not the neceffity, but the will to break the law that makes the action unjust; and what neceffary cause foever precedes an action, yet if that ac tion be forbidden, he that doth it willingly may jufly be punifhed. And do not they fay the fame who make it neceffary. for man in a lapsed state to fin; that is, tranfgrefs the law of God; and yet add, (b) that this hinders not that, quo minus liberè in peccatum feratur, et bonum lege præceptum averíetur et omittat, his finning and omitting the good required by the law is done freely.

7thly. And lastly, he afferts, that (c) things may be neces fary and yet praiseworthy, and alfo neceffary, and yet difpraifed; which plainly is the fame with the doctrine of those men who say that, inevitabile non tollit rationem meriti, aut demeriti, the inevitable neceffity of an action hinders not the merit or demerit, reward or punishment of that action. And further to complete the parallel, obferve.

1. That fin having no efficient, but only a deficient cause, to lie under an unfruftrable defect of doing that which is after that defect commanded, and under a like difability of avoid. ing that which is afterwards forbidden, is to be determined to and lie under a neceffity of finning, that is, of tranfgreffing

(P) Negant proteftantium plurimi poft peccatum in homine manfiffe liberum arbitrium refpectu boni moralis. Le Blanc. de Lib. Hom.

Arb. circa bonum Morale, Par. 2. Sec. 43. (9) Bramh. p. 651. -(r). Bramh. p. 654, 660, 666.—(S) Bramh. P. 678.————(6) Le Blanc, ib. Sec. 56.-—— ('c') Br. p. 679.

thefe laws, because it is to lie under a neceffity of being thus deficient.

2dly. That though it feemeth certain, that this neceffary defect is ab extrinfeco, from an external caufe, it being, faith St. Auftin, Poena Peccati, the punishment of fin, and to the action of the judge; it being, faith Bishop Davenant, the refult of God's arbitrary imputation when he was free, if he had pleafed to do otherwife; it being, 3dly, a defect immediately tefulting from the action of others, the tranfgreffion of Adam that is, of one perfon, and the birth of all men from him, and without any other requifite than that of being born; yet were it ab intrinfeco, from an internal caufe, as blindness, deafness, difability to fpeak, is in them who are born blind, deaf or dumb, it must be ftill as inevitable as the defect is in thefe inftances; and lapsed man thus born, must be as much disabled by it, as he could be from any extrinfic caufe whatsoever; and therefore feeing by it he lies under as great neceffity of being thus defective as he who is determined by an extrinfic cause to be fo; and that extrinfic neceffity is allowed to render the action of him who lieth under it unculpable, it must be likewife thus with him who lies under the like neceffity from an intrinfic cause immediately refulting from his birth,

3dly. Obferve, that it is the fame thing as to my obedience or difobedience to have a difability by nature, as to have it from the fubftance or matter of which I am compofed; be cause by having it from the fin of my nature before I had a being, I come into the world as much difabled as I could be by the other, from the performing due obedience, or the avoiding difobedience to the laws of God.

4thly. Obferve, that it is the fame thing as to my eternal interest to have no free will at all, as to have none in reference to the conditions on which that intereft depends; and therefore it is no great difference betwixt the opinion of these men and that of Mr. Hobbs, that the one deftroys the liberty of all our actions, and theirs only deftroys our liberty in fpir itual and moral actions; feeing both equally destroy our lib erty of choosing life eternal, and of avoiding everlasting death.

SECTION II. With thefe we may compare the fate allerted by the Stoicks and by many others; for though they talk more than others of the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν and the αυτεξέσιον, the things we have in our power, and the power we have over ourfelves; yet all this at the laft amounts only to an auraKOLY E avayans, a liberty of doing what must be done out of neceffity: for all the liberty they allow to the will of man is this, that he may freely do what if he doth refufe to do, fate will compel him to do; or may refuse to do what if he would do, fate will compel him to leave undone. This they explain by the ex-.

ample of a dog (d) tied to a cart's tail; he may follow with out being drawn, but if he doth not, he must follow by being drawn. Τὸ αυτὸ δή πε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ μὴ βελόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπρώμενον εἰσελθεῖν. And this alfo is the cafe of men, for if they will not follow fate, they fhall by all means be neceffitated to come under the laws of fate. Their wife man, faith (e) Seneca, doth nothing unwillingly Neceffitatem effugit quia vult quod ipfa coactura eft, ke avoids neceffity by doing willingly what otherwife fhe would compel him to do; and this is the plain import of the prayer of (f) Epictetus out of Cleanthes, lead me, O fate, to that to which thou haft ordained, that I may follow willingly; for if I do not follow fo, I fhall be compelled to do it.

2dly. This neceffity, fay they, proceedeth from external and antecedent caules; as either; ft. The eternal decree of God difpofing all things to happen as they do. (g) Omnia certâ, et in æternum dictâ lege decurrunt, all things, faith Seneca, follow by a certain law established from eternity; Olim conftitutum eft quid gaudeas quid fleas, it is of old ordained at what we shall rejoice or weep. (h) Fata nos ducunt, we are led by fate; and the firft law of fate is this, ftare decreto, that God will land to his decree, and not be moved from it by prayers or facrifices. If any man doth profitably use them, Id ipfum quoque in fato eft, it is alfo his fate to use them.Accordingly (i) the concourfe of caufes, faith Mr. Hobbs, whereof every one is determined to be fuch, may well be called the decree of God in this refpect, that they were all fet and ordered by the eternal caufe of all things, God Almighty. Or, 2dly. being an eternal series of caufes upon which all effects depend, (k) ordinem rerum fati æterna feries rotat, caufa ex caufa pendet, the eternal courfe of fate turns about all things, faith Seneca, one caufe depends upon another. It is, fay all, (1) an immutable feries of caufes, by virtue of which thus knit to one another, all things are produced; or a fatal neceffity, by virtue of which whatfoever happens flows from a continuation of caufes. Now here observe with Bifhop Bramhall,

(d) Liber ined. apud Menaque in illud Stoicorum apud Laert. næð” ɛ¦μαρμένην δε φάσι πάντα γενέσθαι. 1. 7. p. 459.

(e) Ep. 54.

(1) Αγε με σὺ ἡ πεπρωμένη ὕποι πό τε ὑμῖν εἶμι διατεταγμένος ὡς ἔψομαι γὲ ἄσκνος ἦν δὲ γὲ μὴ θέλω ἐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι. Enchirid. p. 37. (8) De Provid. c. 5.(b) Natural. Qu. c. 36, 37.——(i) Br. p. 665.(k) Ubi fupra.

(1) Immutabilis caufarum cohærentium feries, Sen. ad Helvid.c. 8. Fatalis quædam neceffitas quà, quicquid accidit, id ex caufarum conti nuatione fluxiffe dicitur. Cic. de Nat. D. 1. 1. n. 30, 39 De Div. l. 1. n. 106. De Fato, n15. Plut. de Pl. Philof. I. 2. c. 27, 28. De Stoic. Repugn. p. 1056: